This article examines the literal and figurative domestication of Straits Chinese, or Peranakan, history in selected heritage projects in late twentieth-century Malaysia and Singapore. These projects simultaneously foreground Straits Chinese history as a symbol of interracial harmony and marginalize it as a cultural artifact. Over the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the ethnoculturally hybrid Straits Chinese positioned themselves as "the King's Chinese," champions of a Confucian-values renaissance, and citizens of independent Malaysia and Singapore. Their adaptability helped them survive the upheaval of imperialism, decolonization, and nation building, but it was also controversial for its suggestion of political flexibility. Today, Southeast Asian governments and the Peranakan themselves depict the community as a uniquely local model of ethnic integration. Museums and historic homes emphasize portrayals and consumption of supposedly feminine aspects of Peranakan culture (e.g., fashion and cuisine), while downplaying purportedly masculine elements (e.g., the possession of multiple nationalities). By conflating femininity, tradition, and racial hybridity, this approach reifies stereotypes about gender and cultural identity, and replaces transgressive potential with politically anodyne nostalgia and commercialization. As anxieties about race, national history, and belonging continue to undergird the modern polity, transnationalism and transculturalism are acceptable as long as they are confined to the past.
Paradoxically, the lesser degree of government interest and intervention in Malaysia has enabled greater variety in memorializations of Straits Chinese history and identity formation.
Academics and informed commentators have long worked to explicate the multifaceted history of the Peranakan community in Malaysia and Singapore. Their research covers, among other things, the transnational intricacies of Straits Chinese business and political networks (Chua 2008; Frost 2005) , literature and the arts (Bernards 2012; Khor 2008b) , and sociopolitical endeavors such as education (Rudolph 1998) . Experts have challenged received wisdom about the character of Peranakan identity, suggesting, for example, that it was neither as Anglicized nor as segregated from more recently arrived Chinese immigrants as earlier historians have theorized (Frost 2003) . However, these nuances seldom appear in more widely consumed representations of Peranakan culture. Popular images of the Peranakan, especially the Nyonya, manifest in visual discourses-museum exhibits, heritage projects or events, and mass media productions-that elide complications and internal contradictions. The domestication of Peranakan culture is long running and widespread, but has not yet been extensively studied in relation to the nexus of gender, race, and cultural identity in the postcolonial nation. In postcolonial Malaysia and Singapore, state paternalism has included a conservative turn in views on gender roles-for example, with the Singaporean education ministry decreeing compulsory home economics in girls' schools during the 1980s and 1990s, or politicians in both countries blaming unwanted declines in marriage and birth rates on higher rates of advanced education among women. In this environment, the idea that femininity and culture are somehow apolitical antidotes to the strains of multiracial nation building is a concept deserving of scrutiny. This article addresses this implicit connection in depth, thereby contributing a new analytical dimension to the scholarly conversation. I focus on heritage projects in the late twentieth century, during which time both the historical subjects and present-day sponsors of Peranakan descent typically belonged to an elite class whose relevant publications were often in English. My analysis draws more heavily from images than from text, and more from English-language sources published over the past fifty years than from Chinese-or Malay-language sources from the more distant past. 6 Given the nature of Straits Chinese cultural identity and practices that are more fully explicated below, these sources are essential for understanding the discursive processes and political implications involved in presenting the Peranakan to the contemporary viewer.
The Only Constant Is Change: Straits Chinese and Peranakan Identities
The freighted task of defining "Straits Chinese" and "Peranakan" is a political act in and of itself. In present-day Malaysia and Singapore, the broadest and most generally accepted definition is that they are descendants of Chinese (typically Fujianese) males and local (Malay) females, who resided primarily in the former Straits Settlements of Penang, Singapore, and
Melaka. Their culture integrated Chinese and Malay language, dress, and foodways. With the advent of British colonialism in the Malay world during the late eighteenth century, Straits
Chinese culture took on an Anglicized dimension, embracing the English language and intellectual ideas, and adopting Western European dress and leisure activities. Over time, the category of Straits Chinese expanded to include the locally born descendants of Chinese who were born in China but migrated to the Straits Settlements, especially if they married into Straits
Chinese families (Frost 2003) . However, this relatively straightforward description is immediately complicated by the changing historical contexts in which the Straits Chinese lived, adapted, and identified themselves. The challenge of defining this group is a testament to the shifting political and cultural ground on which they stood, and points to the malleability of race and culture-categories that postcolonial Malaysia and Singapore have struggled to delineate and stabilize.
Experts on Peranakan history are careful to distinguish between the many labels applied to this community, as each has particular political and historical resonances. The term Peranakan, which generally denotes heritage from intermarriage between a non-local male and an indigenous female, can refer to many types of mixed-race populations in present-day Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines (Coppel 2012 (Reid 2009 ).
In Malaysia and Singapore, the term Peranakan is sometimes used interchangeably with the term Straits Chinese. However, the latter term is also open to debate and criticism. Given its geographic association, it technically refers to place of birth rather than strictly to ethnocultural roots-so all Straits Chinese were locally born in the Straits Settlements, but not all locally born Chinese are necessarily Straits Chinese. Present-day scholars charge that the term seems to perpetuate racial categories that reflected the prejudices of the British imperial regime (Suryadinata 2002, 72-73; Hardwick 2008, 38-39) . For example, colonial authorities included the category of "Straits-born Chinese" in the 1891, 1901, and 1911 censuses of the Straits Settlements, but omitted it thereafter (Hirschman 1987, 564) . As such, the argument goes, it is best used in a strictly historical context, to refer to the group as it saw itself during the period when the Straits Settlements were still in existence.
Yet other variations in meaning further enrich and complicate the picture. The designations Baba (an honorific for men that originated in North India) and Nyonya (an honorific for women derived from Portuguese by way of Malay) are less bound to colonial time and place, and hence more commonly used today by members of the community to describe themselves.
Like the term Peranakan, these descriptors can also apply to Chinese-Malay creoles in other Southeast Asian venues (Suryadinata 2002, 74; Hardwick 2008, 39-40) . Furthermore, not all Straits Chinese groups were alike across each of the three Straits Settlements. The oldest population, located in Melaka, tended to speak more Malay with an admixture of some Fujianese dialect elements. In Penang, the reverse was true; their language was dominated by Fujianese with some Malay woven in (Suryadinata 2002, 78; Yoong and Zainab 2004, 180) . Geography contributed yet more linguistic and cultural complexity-in the northern state of Kelantan, for example, Peranakan creole included elements of the Thai language (Tan 1982) .
The constraints of this discussion allow no more than a cursory glance over the long history of the Straits Chinese, but even the briefest survey reveals a past that is at least as complex as the nomenclature surrounding them. The Peranakan were products of interracial unions during a time when creolization and European anxieties about race proliferated across colonial Southeast Asia (Stoler 2010) . In the Peranakan community, leadership was in the hands of merchant-entrepreneurs and intellectual literati, whom the British also relied upon to mediate relations with and among the more recently arrived immigrant Chinese (Heng 1998, 173; Frost 2005, 40-41) . During the mid-to late nineteenth century, Peranakan elites became increasingly Western-oriented. Whether through their embrace of English language and culture, conversion to Christianity, or public pronouncements of a pro-Western nature, these "King's Chinese" appeared to have closer ties with the British than other ethnic Chinese sojourners and settlers in the region. Yet it is important not to overstate the degree of their Anglicization. Many Straits Chinese had facility in multiple languages and cultural codes, switched back and forth between them depending on whether they were in private or public settings and who they were dealing with (British colonials, the Chinese state, or non-locally born Chinese), and were able to hold plural identities that grew out of their cosmopolitan existence (Frost 2003, 17; Lewis 2009 ).
In the 1890s, the Straits Chinese position of socioeconomic advantage began to erode, China-born (Kuhn 2008, 250) . In response, from approximately 1895 to the late 1910s, the Straits Chinese male elite embarked on a Chinese cultural reform movement, sometimes also called a Confucianist revival, to elevate their community's standing. Straits Chinese leaders promoted the study of Chinese language, classical literature, and Confucian moral philosophy (Doran 1997, 95) . This movement was conservative in that it sought to preserve and resuscitate certain components of their Chinese identity. However, it was also coupled with a quest for Chinese now sought to downplay or remove the "Malay accretions" in their culture, especially through the education and modernization of their girls and women (Doran 1997, 98 Mandarin-language soap opera series titled The Little Nyonya became a media sensation, attracting the largest television viewership in the country in fourteen years. This enthusiastic embrace of the Nyonya is at once ironic and logical. As the personification of tradition, even backwardness, at the turn of the twentieth century, she was an object of embarrassment and a target of modernizing reform efforts for Straits Chinese elites (Teoh 2014) . By the turn of the twenty-first, she had become the most widely recognized and celebrated symbol of the modern Peranakan community-one that was presented to international tourists as well as domestic citizens for admiration and emulation. This about-face seems less abrupt when we consider that this figure of tradition was highly compatible with the postcolonial state's construction of a national historical narrative, acknowledging its complex multiethnic past while keeping it safely contained within a diorama of domesticity. From the 1990s onward, Malaysian and Singaporean state authorities directed concerted strategies and significant monies toward cultural tourism, in particular rejuvenating their national museums. The 1995 Singapore Tourist Promotion Board and Ministry for Information and the Arts campaign to turn the island-state into a "Global City for the Arts" included the launch of three major museums that would present Singapore as a multicultural mélange of old and new, East and West (Ooi 2010, 90-91) . Managed by the National Heritage Board (NHB), these three museums-the National Museum of Singapore, the Singapore Arts Museum, and the Asian Civilizations Museum-were important elements of this push to expand the "creative economy," attracting foreign visitors while consolidating Singapore's sense of national identity. As articulated by the chief executive officer of the NHB and the National Art Gallery, arts and culture would "contribute to the positioning of Singapore as a vibrant global city,… making it a great place to live, work, and play in, and a quality avenue for tourism expenditure and extended stay" (Koh 2010, 287) . In Malaysia, the flagship National Museum was renovated and expanded in 2007, absorbing the exhibits of the smaller and more nuanced National History Museum (Thompson 2012, 57) . Although the latter went further than the former in exploring regional ethnology and migrations-displaying artifacts and maps that illustrated the movement of prehistoric peoples throughout Southeast Asia, for example-both museums emphasized an ethnically Malay origin story, focusing heavily on the ancestry and migration of Malay peoples and the achievements of Malay sultanates, with marginal references to the other ethnic groups that compose almost half of modern Malaysia's population (Thompson 2012, 62) .
In both countries, state authorities demonstrated keen awareness of the museum as a useful device for controlling the narrative of past, present, and future, acting as what Benedict
Anderson called an "institution of power" (Anderson 1991) . The late modern European tradition of museums-the collection, taxonomy, and display of objects deemed curious or significantwas congruent with imperial ideologies of power, particularly in the effort to "know" and control the natural and human environment. In Southeast Asia, this colonial legacy, rather than dissipating with the rise of national independence, in fact dovetailed with the new impulse to uncover an indigenous history that would support a strong contemporary cultural and political identity (Henderson 2003 184) . Of course, the potentially hegemonic nature of museum projects may well be, and often is, leavened by the important work of preserving, educating, and providing a space for civic sociability. Even so, state-sponsored museums and heritage projects tend to present regional or international processes from a nation-centered perspective, constructing narratives that lead, teleologically, from eras of patchwork diversity to national integration and unity (Thompson 2012, 78) . It was within this context that the conservation of Peranakan history shifted into museums, and into mainstream nationalist discourse. Symbolically, the institution is housed in the former campus of a Chinese school. In introducing the focus of its exhibits, the museum's literature states: "The Peranakan culture is a unique hybrid culture that is still part of Singapore's living heritage" (Peranakan Museum 2013 "About the Peranakans"). Of its ten permanent galleries, two are devoted to the community's historical origins and "public life"-i.e., commerce, politics, and social activities. The remaining eight are given over to cultural themes, such as arts and crafts, religion, and "Food and Feasting." One of these galleries focuses on women's dress, beadwork, and their role in preserving and transmitting Peranakan traditions (figure 3). Another walks the viewer through the elaborate rituals of a twelve-day-long Peranakan wedding, from gift exchanges to the Manchu-style dress of the bride and groom, and from the nuptial procession to a reproduction of a marital bedchamber (figure 4).
The curatorial choices in these galleries are revealing. The Peranakan Museum's exhibits depict Straits Chinese or Peranakan culture as a subset of twenty-first-century Singaporean national character. As a piece of its local "living heritage," this culture is both alive and trapped in a sort of narrative amber. The multivalence and fungibility of Peranakan identity construction, when it does show through, is presented as a thing of the past and not a process that might still be ongoing. Most museums and historical displays struggle with the challenge of depicting the motion and dynamism of life in a stationary format, let alone capturing the subtle nuances of complex cultures while appealing to a diverse audience. Nonetheless, the static nature of these objects in the Peranakan Museum is especially effective at supporting the notion of an alreadyfixed ethnocultural identity. Also, a heavy focus on the domestic (and, hence, female) realm as a more authentic source of Peranakan culture draws attention away from the more male-dominated public and political aspects of the community's history. This is especially apparent with the space given to Nyonya clothing: the sarong skirt and the kebaya tunic, fastened with intricate metalwork belts and pins, and augmented with jeweled hair accessories and hand-beaded slippers. Though never jettisoned as emblems of Peranakan culture, these garments were historically a means for women to integrate the more traditional and Malay aspects of their heritage into their private daily lives. These Malay aspects were publicly downplayed during Straits Chinese efforts to modernize and reform around the turn of the twentieth century, but are now foregrounded in these exhibits and elsewhere as defining features of the Peranakan. Hardly any exhibit space is granted to Baba clothing, perhaps for the very prosaic reason that, from the late nineteenth century on, many Babas typically wore Western clothing, which might not make for a very colorful display. However, this perspective also reinforces the idea that adoption of Western traits was not an authentic or representative feature of Peranakan life. In actuality, this practice was part of a deliberate Straits Chinese strategy to suggest a kind of modern hybridity, cultivated by male elites in the public eye and similar to the donning of Western attire by self-consciously modern men in China (Frost 2003, 27 ).
In 1899, as part of a modernizing reform movement, prominent Peranakan community leader Lim Boon Keng published a series of articles in the Straits Chinese Magazine that proposed some key changes in Baba appearance. Lim argued that Straits Chinese men should cut off their queues, because the "wearing of the tow-chang [queue] by British subjects is quite improper" (1899a, 25). He also suggested a syncretic but Western-oriented mode of dress for Babas, calling for them to don European-style shirt collars, ceremonial hats, and specially made "reform shoes" that retained a traditional Chinese look while being adapted for more practical use (1899b, 58). This fashion would be "a genuine product of the Straits Chinese," he enthused, "a dress evolved out of our own ideas making free use of all articles European and Chinese," but careful to omit what Lim considered to be "grotesque" or archaic Chinese elements of style (1899b, 58). In this same series of articles, Lim says virtually nothing about Nyonya dress and the Malay-Chinese sarong kebaya, ignoring the undeniable influence of Malay culture in Peranakan daily life. Clearly, neither Baba nor Nyonya attire were a neutral matter of aesthetics.
Rather, this was a political arena in which the Straits Chinese made self-conscious and symbolic choices to project a certain image.
Efforts at social and cultural rejuvenation aside, the early decades of the twentieth century were turbulent ones for the Straits Chinese and their wish to stabilize their identity Peranakan wealth and status came to be associated with colonial collaboration and a luxurious lifestyle that was out of step with the struggles of nation building and economic recovery.
Criticisms included the accusation, published in a Singaporean newspaper in 1967, that Straits
Chinese "leaders are self-centered persons who prefer to lead comfortable lives on the old pattern rather than adjust themselves to the new political order" (Eastern Sun, May 21, 1967 , cited in Rudolph 1998 . Peranakan culture was "honored as something in the past, not as a model for a future Singaporean identity" (Clammer 1998, 169) . Under these circumstances, it is understandable that most Peranakans may have chosen to allow their ethnocultural identity, or at least the most sensitive political aspects of it, to be quietly subsumed by new national categories until its resurgence in the late twentieth century.
The Peranakan Museum's gendered emphasis on the private domain-household spaces, women's clothing, cooking, handicrafts, and "women's rituals" such as weddings-does more than separate culture and politics, or render dynamic culture as static art. It also resonates with the viewpoint adopted by many early twentieth-century Asian nationalist movements that women are the natural keepers of indigenous tradition and cultural memory, which gave men more latitude to pursue Western modernization (Chatterjee 1999, 238-239 however, this was not an easy bargain. In the pages of the abovementioned Straits Chinese Magazine, for example, much ink would be spilled on the moral degeneracy and intellectual backwardness of the kebaya-clad Nyonya, whose illiteracy, superstition, and penchant for bad habits such as gambling were a hindrance to Peranakan advancement. As described earlier, Straits Chinese women embodied not only tradition but also the indigenous Malay elements in Peranakan culture, all of which had to be pushed further into the background to allow Baba elites to portray themselves as progressive and "deserving of the citizenship of the British Empire" (Lim 1899a, 23). This ambivalent relationship with the many cultural facets of the self is barely detectable in the Peranakan Museum's displays of material culture.
In Singapore, a twenty-first-century postcolonial state whose stunning economic rise has been accompanied by struggles to blend Western modernization, Southeast Asian "cultural values," and top-down policies for building national unity, the domestication of Straits Chinese history has useful applications. Directing attention to the feminine and domestic allows a complex ethnocultural history to become palatable and even laudable, to the extent that it does not upset the existing social order (Ooi 2003, 84) . It also creates an opening for a group with ties to diasporic networks to assert an autochthonous connection during a postcolonial era in which fractious racial politics and hostility toward immigrant minorities have waxed rather than waned.
The Peranakan are hence able to claim both cultural authenticity and local belonging in a nonthreatening way, while supporting a positive national image of multiculturalism. Although there is an undeniable merit-even a pressing need-for social histories that highlight the quotidian activities of previously marginalized groups and spaces, such as women and the home, the approach described above remains in service of the nation and its political goals, and does not adequately capture the full spectrum of diversity and creativity in these individuals' lived experiences (Yeoh 2003, 38) . Non-domestic but historically significant dimensions of Nyonya life, such as formal education, professional accomplishments, and engagement or leadership in social and philanthropic organizations receive relatively scant attention.
State-sanctioned authorities' nostalgia for Straits Chinese material culture has likely set the tone for historical preservation efforts by private groups and individuals. One example is a semi-private house museum in Singapore affiliated with the Peranakan Museum, known as The Intan (Malay for "gem"), which combines cultural-historical exhibition with commercial interests. The Intan is a private, non-historic residence, whose owner uses the space to showcase The Intan finds popular acceptance and commercial viability by offering a domestic experience of Straits Chinese history, with opportunities to consume and purchase desirable objects from this history. Its combination of heritage tourism with capitalist modernity was prefigured by the restoration of historic buildings in the downtown "Peranakan Place" shopping district and the local Chinatown-both of which have been critiqued as inauthentic and commercially driven, but nonetheless became highly visible stopping points on most tourist itineraries (Rudolph 1998, 273-286; Henderson 2003, 41) .
Unlike Singapore, present-day Malaysia does not have just one major state-sponsored museum or institute specifically dedicated to Peranakan history and culture. This fact reflects the larger size and diversity of the latter country, in which Peranakan descendants are more dispersed and show greater variation across different locales (Carstens 2005, 135) . It also speaks to Malaysia's racial demographics, in which the Chinese population is in the minority and interethnic tensions simmer barely below the surface. In Melaka, for example, formerly one of the major centers of Peranakan economic and cultural life, government efforts have concentrated on promoting this historic site as the ancestral origin of the Malay state (Thompson 2012, 72) .
Such efforts simultaneously acknowledge and downplay the highly cosmopolitan nature of Melaka's early history, wherein Dutch, Portuguese, Indian, Chinese, Peranakan, and other Southeast Asian influences were integral parts of the trading port's character (Worden 2010, 130) . Still, there are a number of private institutions showcasing Peranakan heritage. Although their mandate may not be government-dictated, many echo dominant national discourses and cater to popular tastes by concentrating on the domestic and material dimensions of the Peranakan past. This may well also be out of economic and political necessity. At the same time, others of these institutions offer a more nuanced picture of Straits Chinese life. This historic home showcases decorative elements of the "Straits Eclectic" style, such as Victorian ceramic figurines, blackwood mother-of-pearl furniture, and cast-iron staircase balusters from Glasgow. A major showpiece in the entrance hall of the house is an intricately carved wooden screen that separates the public front parlor, for receiving guests, from the private rear parlor, to which Peranakan women were confined, and from whence they could peer out at male non-relatives with whom they were not allowed to interact. Similarly, the Straits Chinese Jewellery Museum of Melaka offers visitors a chance to step into a re-creation of a Peranakan home, complete with historical architecture and furnishings that offer a backdrop to a substantial collection of Peranakan jewelry and clothing (figure 6). 10 In 2013 beadwork collections, Cheah shows that this stereotypically Peranakan handicraft was neither as domestic nor as localized as popular accounts suggest (Cheah 2007) . Instead, portions or even entire pieces of Nyonya beadwork were likely imported from China. Locally, some of the embroidery was made and sold on a small scale by women performing individual commissions or piecework for haberdashers, providing them with a source of income despite society's disapproval of their working outside the home (Cheah 2007, 78) . A corollary to this was that beadwork was not always the marker of domestic expertise that a Nyonya might wish to display in, say, her bridal trousseau for her wedding chamber. Rather, being able to purchase fine beadwork or employ servants to do the sewing was a stronger signal of the woman's wealth and status (Cheah 2007, 84) . Through this fine-grained analysis of Nyonya decorative arts, Cheah overturns a number of assumptions about Peranakan domesticity and illuminates the patterns of trade circulation among China, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Hers would be a valuable perspective to add to existing museum displays of Peranakan handicrafts. One element of Peranakan heritage tourism that has not been well explored thus far is how projects in this area have fallen short in reflecting the erstwhile interconnections among various Peranakan communities in Singapore, Penang, Melaka, and elsewhere. The familial, political, and socioeconomic ties between these locales have been attenuated by time and geopolitics, and there may also now be a sense of competition over how museum projects are being conducted. In recent years, some advocates of cultural conservation in Penang have expressed frustration that they are well behind Singapore in funding and political will to promote their Peranakan heritage, and are even losing their artifacts to the latter as donors sell or bequeath their heirlooms across national borders to more high-profile institutions (Khor 2008a; StokesRees 2013, 43) . In this case, state-sponsored heritage projects have opened up nation-based divides within an originally transnational community.
Conclusion
For an extended period in British Malayan and Singaporean history, the Straits Chinese exerted an influence that was disproportionate to their small numbers, not least in undermining assumptions that "race, nationality, and political loyalty were coterminous" (Chua 2010, 150).
They represent a time when the multifariousness of race, nationality, cultural choices, and political affiliations blended and overlapped in ways that challenged first the imperial order and then the hard, bright lines of the emerging nation. In the postcolonial era, this history was a discomfiting reminder to those who wished to create a new vision of an integrated state, especially in a region of the world where "history mocks the nation-state's claims to ethnic and linguistic exclusiveness" (Harper 1997, 261) . Nation-building strategies depended on discrete racial categories and the creation-or at least the appearance-of a harmonious multicultural state. In Malaysia and Singapore, the Straits Chinese embodiment of interracial marriage, transcultural sensibilities, and close identification with British imperial privilege marked them as a relic of the colonial age (Chua 2010). The problem of where to situate this population was compounded by the persistence of Malay-Chinese racial tensions in both countries, albeit with different dynamics in each country.
In this context, heritage and tourism projects-including museums and private preservation efforts-were useful instruments in fashioning new, unifying national histories and identities (Stokes-Rees 2013, 33) . This task was especially pressing in the immediate postcolonial era, when the need to realize the "imagined community" turned state attention to the use of historical, archaeological, and cultural legacies to present visions of accomplishment and resilience, from before and lasting through colonial occupation (Anderson 1991, 178-185) . The selective inclusion of certain elements from Peranakan culture has become part of this effort, and has grown to bolster a sense of indigenous authenticity as a bulwark against increasing globalization and Westernization in the twenty-first century (Ooi 2003, 80) . Especially in Singapore, state and state-sanctioned authorities have found a means to rehabilitate potentially subversive overseas Chinese identity practices, folding them neatly into the postcolonial national narrative (Hong and Huang 2008) . While not necessarily representative of all efforts to preserve Straits Chinese history, these projects simultaneously foreground this culture as a symbol of a uniquely local heritage and marginalize it as a museum artifact in present-day Southeast Asia, co-opting the Straits Chinese experience in service of national unity and state-approved multiculturalism.
The combined effect of these public messages has, intentionally or otherwise, associated a complex, hybridized group with a static ethnocultural form, gendered images, and political only do ordinary things become special when placed in museum settings, but also the museum experience itself becomes a model for experiencing life outside its walls" (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1991, 410 Some scholars consider the Straits Chinese only to have come into being as a welldefined community in the seventeenth century, even though there is evidence of these intermarriages and their resulting cultural amalgamations from earlier times (Khoo 1998 ). 3
The British acquired control over Penang in 1786, Singapore in 1819, and Melaka in 1824, amalgamating the three into the Straits Settlements in 1826. 4
The description of this event was reported by S. K. Lee (2013) . 5
See, for example, Karp and Lavine (1991) . 6
Non-English sources in Straits Chinese culture are more thoroughly researched in other studies, especially in the field of literature-see, for example, Bernards (2012) and Yoong and Zainab (2004) . 7
For more on female education and the Straits Chinese, see Teoh (2014) . 8
For a closer analysis of the exoticization of the kebaya-clad Singapore Airlines flight attendants, and how the figure of the Nyonya is conflated with Singaporean national tourism and the service industry, see Hardwick (2008, 49-51) . 9
My argument engages with the discussion started by Stokes-Rees in her study of two museums in Singapore, which theorizes that the Peranakan Museum's presentation of a hybrid polity suggests "movement towards a more post-multicultural mindset in Singapore" (Stokes-Rees 2013, 35) . This paper looks at a variety of museums and private historic homes in Singapore and Malaysia, interprets the Peranakan Museum's approach as a means of taming a transnational past to suit a state-prescribed vision of multiculturalism, and places greater stress on gender as an analytical lens and a political issue in heritage projects.
